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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: THE LAW'S RESPONSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Abortion laws appear to provide a classic example of the law's role in fol-
lowing social trends, rather than in leading social advancements. The law has
changed from providing for no punishment where a pregnancy is intentionally
aborted before "quickening," 1 to charging a felony for inducing abortion, cer-
tain exceptions notwithstanding. As a result, the law stands today in a vulner-
able position. When courts strike down anti-abortion statutes, a certain segment of
the population sees the result as a further decline of traditional morality. When,
on the other hand, courts find such statutes constitutional, they are met with a
barrage of criticism from those favoring liberalized abortion statutes. The main
criticism is that archaic ideas permeate the law and are inflexibly followed de-
spite changed social requirements.
No certain figures exist on the number of legal and illegal abortions per.
formed each year in the United States, but estimates usually run from 200,000
to 1,500,000 per year for illegal abortions and approximately 8,000 legal
(therapeutic) abortions per year.xa A 1965 public opinion poll conducted by the
National Fertility Study showed that a majority of those interviewed favored
legalization of abortions to protect the health of the mother, while only eight per
cent favored abortion for any woman who wanted it; that is, abortion on de-
mand. 2 In 1967, a Gallup poll revealed twenty-one per cent of those interviewed
favored abortion on demand.3 A 1969 Gallup poll reported that forty per cent
of the persons questioned said they believed abortion is a private matter between
physician and patient.4
The following survey of recent court decisions will demonstrate the manner
in which courts are beginning to respond to changed social attitudes. A short
summary of medical facts will provide the necessary frame of reference in
which to examine the recent cases.
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
Abortions have been performed on women for thousands of years. In
2600 B.C., China's Emperor Shen Nung recited a formula for an abortifacient
consisting primarily of mercury. No lesser persons than Hippocrates, Aristotle
1 Quickening is the term applied to the pregnant woman's awareness of the movements
of the baby in utero.
la Schulder and Kennedy (eds.), Abortion Rap ix (1971).
2 Tietze and Lewit, Abortion, 220 Scientific American 23 (1969).
3 Id.
4 Abortion and the Changing Law, 75 Newsweek 15 at 54 (1970).
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and Plato advocated abortion as a method of population control. 5 To the medi-
cally sophisticated and unsophisticated alike, many methods of attempting to
induce a criminal abortion are known; among them are: packing the uterus
with gauze and waiting for expulsion of fetus and placenta; inserting into the
uterus rubber tubes, knitting needles, small tree branches, crochet hooks, coat
hangers or any other object long and sharp enough to penetrate the amniotic
sac; ingesting drugs ranging from herb broth to white phosphorus, copper sul-
phate and potassium permanganate; injecting soap-water or salt-water solutions
into the distended uterus; and engaging in other miscellaneous activities, such
as taking hot showers, doing deep-knee bends and sit-ups, riding a galloping
horse, running and physically beating on the pregnant woman's swollen belly.
Some of these methods succeed in inducing uterine contractions and eventual
abortion of the pregnancy. Concommitantly these methods may also produce the
following: (1) infection with resulting sterility, hysterectomy, hemorrhage,
laceration or perforation of the walls of the vagina, uterus or intestines, (2)
burns resulting from skin contact with a strong chemical agent, (3) death.
Acceptable medical procedures exist for aborting a pregnancy. They in-
clude D. and C., 6 chemical abortifacients7 and suction.8 As with any medical
procedure there are dangers to the patient: a bad result of a D. and C. could be
perforation of vaginal, uterine or intestinal walls; a chemical abortifacient
could result in illness from a side-effect. The suction method9 seems the least
likely to cause a bad result, although a danger of hemorrhage exists caused by
the abrupt and traumatic separation of the placenta from the uterine wall. The
compensating safety factor for a patient is that she is in a clinical or hospital
environment usually equipped to handle such emergencies. These medically-ap-
proved methods are generally so successful that statistically a woman may
undergo an abortion more safely than carry a baby to term.10
Anatomically, pregnancy occurs when a spermatozoon penetrates an ovum.
Cell division commences shortly thereafter. The time span from fertilization to
uterine implantation is believed to be approximately fifteen days.'1 Much is
known about embryonic and fetal growth. Seven weeks into the first trimester of
5 Supra n.2.
6 A "D & C" is a rather common surgical procedure. The initials are for dilation and
curettage. The neck of the uterus is stretched or dilated to allow insertion of a curet, a
longhandled scoop used to scrape the uterine lining to remove foreign matter. D & C.
may be performed for a number of reasons, but one of the most common is to remove
remnants of an incomplete spontaneous abortion. The operation is performed under a
general anesthetic.
7 Urgate derivatives are commonly used but may be obtained only by prescription.
8 The suction method employs a small pump that operates on the same principle as a
household vacuum cleaner. A plastic tube is inserted into the uterus, the pump is activated
and the machine removes placenta and fetus. The procedure is said to involve only
minimal pain which lasts about thirty seconds. The abortion is completed in less than three
minutes. Supra n.4 at 55.
9 Id.
10 Supra n.2.
11 Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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pregnancy, a well proportioned, miniature baby exists in utero.12 It looks like
a baby, and its internal organs are distinctly human. By the end of the eighth
week, the fetus is reported to be irreversibly a human being. 13
Professor Byrn quotes a New York physician's observations after he
handled a two-month-old fetus still in the amniotic sac:
Eleven years ago while giving an anesthetic for a ruptured ectopic
pregnancy (at two months gestation) I was handed what I believe was
the smallest living human being ever seen. The embryo sac was intact
and transparent. Within the sac was a tiny (approx. 1 cm.) human
male swimming extremely vigorously in the amniotic fluid, while at-
tached to the wall by the umbilical cord. This tiny human was perfectly
developed, with long tapering fingers, feet and toes. It was almost
transparent, as regards the skin, and the delicate arteries and veins
were prominent to the ends of the fingers.
The baby was extremely alive and swam about the sac approxi-
mately one time per second, with a natural swimmers stroke. This
tiny human did not look at all like the photos and drawings and models
of "embryos" which I have seen, nor did it look like a few embryos I
have been able to observe since then, obviously because this one was
alive! ...
When the sac was opened, the tiny human immediately lost its
life and took on the appearance of an embryo at this age (blunt ex-
tremities, etc.) .... 14
This stage of gestation is especially significant because abortion is rarely in-
duced after the first three months unless the pregnant woman's life is in immi-
nent danger.15
If the pregnancy were to end naturally within the first trimester, a
physician would describe the event as a "spontaneous abortion." This reflects
three conditions: (a) the pregnancy has terminated; (b) the mother's body has
rejected the fetus because of some defect in either the placental attachment or in
the respective blood factors of mother and baby or some other mechanical aspect
of pregnancy; and (c) the event has transpired during the first fifteen weeks of
gestation. The same event occuring between the sixteenth and twenty-eighth
weeks is termed by physicians a "miscarriage." Thereafter and until or very
near the mother's projected "due date," birth of the baby will be called "pre-
mature contractions" or "premature labor."
Courts and attorneys, however, refer to traumatic loss of the baby as a
''miscarriage," regardless of when during gestation the pregnancy terminates.
Courts generally use "miscarriage" and "abortion" synonymously except when
12 This statement and other similar statements hereafter are based on the assumption
of a medically normal pregnancy.
13 Byrn, Abortion-On-Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 N. Dak. L. Rev. 5 (1970).
14 Id. at 8-9.
15 Supra n.2 at 22.
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"abortion" is used to refer specifically to an intentional act by a person other
than the mother to prematurely and traumatically terminate the pregnancy.1"
During the second three months of gestation, the fetus is distinctly human.
It grows from three inches in length to approximately fourteen inches and from
one ounce to approximately two and one-quarter pounds. Sometime during the
last half of this second trimester, the mother will become aware that her baby is
moving in the uterus.17 Although a baby born during this trimester has a slight
chance of survival, ninety per cent of premature births at this time result in the
death of the baby.
In the third trimester, the fetus prepares for the most traumatic event of its
life-birth. A normal fetus grows during this period to its birth size. All its
internal functions become more sophisticated; physiologically it is obviously a
human child. No medical question exists that the baby is now psychologically
an individual. Dr. Arnold Gesell has described the results of his experiments by
saying:
Our own repeated observation of a large group of fetal infants (an in-
dividual born and living at any time prior to forty weeks gestation) left
us with no doubt that psychologically they were individuals. Just as no
two looked alike, so no two behaved precisely alike. One was impassive
when another was alert. Even among the youngest there were dis-
cernible differences in vividness, reactivity and responsiveness. There
were genuine individual differences, already prophetic of the diversity
which distinguishes the human family.'8
III. INDUCED A.BORTION AND THE LAW
A. Historical Perspective
The general consensus of opinion is that prior to an 1803 statute, English
common law did not punish induced abortion before "quickening."' 19 Inducing
an abortion did not become a criminal offense in the United States until about
1830.20 Dr. Robert W. Fox, however, has concluded that inducing an abortion
was an offense at common law in some jurisdictions.2' His conclusion is based
upon the common law rules of Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvaina and
16 Am. Jur. 2d Abortion, § 1(1962).
17 This phenomenon is referred to in law as "quickening."
18 Gesell, The Embryology of Behavior 172 (1945).
19 U.S. v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969); People v. Belous, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 358, 458 P.2d 194, 198 (1969) ; Perkins, Criminal Law 101 (1957) ; Stern, Abor-
tion: Reform and the Law, 59 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 84, 85 (1968). Quickening is the term
applied to the pregnant woman's awareness of the movements of the baby in utero. Quicken-
ing was a good test of pregnancy prior to the twentieth century since no adequate medical
tests for pregnancy existed at the inception of the English common law rule. The only way
a woman could be certain she was pregnant was to detect the baby's movements in her
uterus. As noted earlier, these movements are readily detectable between the fifth and
sixth months.
20 Id.
21 Fox, Abortion: A Question of Right or Wrong?, 57 A.B.AJ. 668 (1971).
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upon two early American cases, one of which stated, "It is a flagrant crime at
common law to attempt to procure the miscarriage or abortion of the woman."
'22
The other case upon which Dr. Fox relies is New Jersey v. Cooper,23 wherein the
court said:
It was anciently holden that the causing of an abortion by giving a
potion to, or striking a woman big with child, was murder; but at this
day it is said to be a great misprision only, and not murder, unless the
child be born alive, and die thereof.... If a woman be quick with child,
and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her womb, or if anyone beat
her whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead
child, this, though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or
manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look upon this offence in
quite so atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous misdemeanor .... 23a
The Illinois statute prohibiting a third person from inducing an abortion
was enacted in 1827.24 The present Illinois statute2 5 was enacted in 1961; the
elements of the offense require neither proof that the woman was pregnant nor
that a "miscarriage" actually resulted. 26 Illinois and a majority of other states27
prohibit recovery for injury or death where a woman consents to having an il-
legal abortion performed on herself. 28 The rationale is basically equitable: the
court will not aid a plaintiff whose claim is based upon her own illegal or
immoral act. This rationale may be subject to attack in a state which has no
statutory offense for inducing an abortion.
Prior to the late 1960's when state and federal courts began holding anti-
abortion statutes unconstitutional, a survey of statutes29 revealed that forty-one
states permitted a therapeutic abortion if its purpose was to save the pregnant
woman's life. Twenty-five of those states expressly exempted any criminal cul-
pability, while nine others exempted criminal penalties where an abortion was
performed by a physician to save the life of the baby or the mother and the
baby. The Illinois statute, which is within this category, is found in Ill. Rev.
Stat. chap. 38, par. 23-1 (1969):
(a) A person commits abortion when he uses any instrument, medicine,
drug or other substance whatever, with the intent to procure a miscar-
riage of any woman. It shall not be necessary in order to commit
22 U.S. v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969); People v. Belous, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 358, 458 P. 20 194, 198 (1969); Perkins, Criminal Law 101 (1957) ; Stern,
Abortion: Reform and the Law, 59 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 84, 85 (1968).
23 22 NJ.L. 52 (1849). The court cites 1 Bi. Comm. 129.
23a Id.
24 Hall, Abortions Laws: A Call for Reform, 18 DePaul L. Rev. 584 (1969).
25 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1969).
26 The statute was declared unconstitutional in Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D.
Ill. 1971), but is still being enforced during appeal. The Doe case and similar cases are
discussed infra.
27 See, Right of Action for Injury or Death of Consenting Woman, 36 A.L.R.3d 630
(1971).
28 Castronovo v. Murawsky, 3 Ill. App. 2d 168, 120 N.E.2d 871 (1954).
29 Whalen, Therapeutic Abortion: A Survey of Existing Legislation 1-3 (A.M.A.).
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abortion that such woman be pregnant or, if pregnant, that a miscar-
riage be in fact accomplished . ..
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to abortion that the abortion was
performed by a physician licensed to practice medicine and surgery in
all its branches and in a licensed hospital or other licensed medical
facility because necessary to the preservation of the woman's life.
This statute was declared to be unconstitutional in Doe v. Scott.29a A temporary
injunction issued by the trial court to enjoin enforcement of the statute was
subsequently stayed pending appeal.
B. The Arguments-Pro and Con
The arguments for and against legalizing all abortions are well known.
Those who believe abortion should not be legalized generally postulate their
argument on the premise that life begins when the ovum is fertilized. Thus, they
argue, the zygote can be nothing other than human life. It may live only a few
hours in utero or it may live eighty years after birth. This argument is some-
times extended to the conclusion that liberalized abortion laws will open the
door to euthanasia, infanticide or destruction of any "non-productive" life. The
argument against abortion on demand holds that legalizing all induced abortions
will encourage sexual promiscuity; some physicians are said to believe that
frequent induced abortions will cause "sterility, menstrual disorders, ectopic
pregnancy . . . , abnormal delivery or guilt feelings that may lead to neurotic
or even psychotic symptoms." 30
Those persons who wish to have anti-abortion legislation abolished gen-
erally begin their argument by stating that the embryo does not become a human
life until some time between three months gestation and the time of quickening
-approximately five or six months. Thus, they argue that an induced abortion
does not take the life of a human being. In addition, those who favor liberal-
ization or termination of anti-abortion statutes maintain that the pregnant
woman's rights are superior to the fetus' rights. Among women's "rights" are:
(1) the mother's health (physical and mental) ; (2) the mother's desire to have
a physically and mentally healthy baby, regardless of whether the cause of the
suspected deformity be genetic, immunoligical (e.g. rubella) or chemical (e.g.
ingestion of thalidomide) ; (3) the mother's desire not to bear a child resulting
from rape or incest; (4) the mother's ultimate right not to bear a child she
does not want; (5) the child's right to be loved; 31 (6) the rights of all persons
29a 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971). Doe is discussed infra.
30 Supra n.2, n.4, n.21, An ectopic pregnancy is one in which gestation commences
somewhere other than the uterus, usually in one of the fallopian tubes.
31 This point seems to raise the spectre of the battered baby. Some people have
argued that unwanted babies are the babies who are ultimately grossly abused physically.
The explanation which is more convincing comes from Dr. Ray E. Helfer, Chariman, De-
partment of Pediatrics, Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn and Queens, N.Y., co-editor
of The Battered Child and author of Helping the Battered Child and Its Family. He is
quoted in Abortion Rap, supra n.1 at 127:
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to be free from debasement resulting from overpopulation.3 2 Advocates of
abolishing anti-abortion laws also argue that criminal abortions result in back-
alley butchery. To abate the physical and emotional abuses of women who seek
a criminal abortion, the abolitionists argue that if anti-abortion statutes did not
exist, the criminal abortionist would be out of business and women would be
saved from brutal physical injuries.
Into the abortion controversy come several new developments: (1) A tre-
mendous decline in the birth rate has occured in the United States; the 1970
census revealed the smallest under-five-years-old population in the 120 years
the statistics have been kept.33 (2) Frozen sperm banks now exist in which men
may deposit semen for future artificial insemination; more than 300 babies
have been born after their mothers were impregnated with sperm that had been
stored in such a bank. 34 (3) Anti-abortion laws in countries having approx-
imately one-third of the world's population, have been generally relaxed. The
countries include: Britain, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary,
Japan, Poland, Romania, Sweden and U.S.S.R. The statutes requiring medical
approval of abortions in those countries vary. Some require a panel of physicians
to approve the abortion and record the medical reasons, while others permit
abortions "on demand" after requiring physicians to instruct the women on the
dangers of terminating a pregnancy and on the desirability of carrying the
baby to term.3 5
C. The State oj the Law
Superimposed upon the arguments for and against anti-abortion statutes
and upon world developments in regard to abortion, are recent court rulings
plus an attempt in Congress to enact legislation providing for abortion on de-
mand anytime prior to 140 days' gestation.3 6 The recent decisions rely heavily
upon the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the
right of privacy, notwithstanding the fact that some of the abortion cases uphold
the statutes involved. A California case,37 for example, held that the fundamental
right of a woman to choose whether to bear children proceeds from: (1)
Griswold v. Connecticut3 which held that the state could not legislate against
Now, regarding the unwanted pregnancy, if the [psychological] potential [to phys-
ically abuse a child] is there-and the crisis could be the pregnancy- . . and
then the baby happens to be a bad baby (... just hard-to-care-for baby)-then all
these things built together are enough to cause the physical abuse. However, without
the potential, the unwanted pregnancy, per se, is not enough to cause physical
injuries to children .... So although unwanted pregnancy is part of the system of
child abuse it has to be fit into that complicated puzzle as the crisis and it cannot
produce the potential, if the potential wasn't there in the first place.
32 Id.
33 Chicago Sun Times, September 7, 1971 at 1 col. 1.
34 Chicago Sun Times, September 5, 1971, Parade mag. at 8 col. 1.
35 Supra n.1, n.2.
36 117 Cong. Rec. S6056-58 (daily ed. May 3, 1971), comments of Sen. Packwood.
37 People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969).
38 381 U.S. 479, 485, 486, 500 (1965).
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the use of contraceptives; (2) Loving v. Virginia"9 which held a statute pro-
scribing miscegenation violated the due process clause; (3) Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson40 which dealt with sterilization laws and the "basic right"
to marry and have children; (4) Pierce v. Society of Sisters41 wherein the
Court struck down state action prohibiting non-public schools and consequently
forcing parents to send their children to public schools; and (5) Meyer v.
Nebraska42 which held unconstitutional a statute proscribing teaching the Ger-
man language to children.
The United States Supreme Court also has examined questions such as
whether the state has a compelling interest in the regulation of the subject
matter of a statute, 43 whether the proscription is in concert with accomplishing
a state policy that is constitutionally permitted to the state44 and whether such
legislation is not overbroad or vague. 45 The Court has also held that, under
the ninth amendment, rights asserted by the parties do not depend for vitality
upon having been enumerated in the Constitution.46
1. The Cases for Abolition of Anti-Abortion Statutes
(a) People v. Belous 47
The defendant was convicted of having violated the anti-abortion statute
after he had referred an unmarried woman to another physician who performed
abortions. The woman had threatened to go to Mexico for a criminal abortion,
or in the alternative, to induce contractions herself if the defendant did not help
her. Dr. Belous testified that he feared for the woman's life if she took either
of those courses of action. The statute under which Dr. Belous was convicted
proscribed abortion, "unless the same is necessary to preserve her life . ..
The California Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional for the following
reasons: (1) the statute was vague; (2) the pregnant woman has a right to
choose whether to bear children, and state interference is tantamount to state
destruction of her right of privacy; (3) the case is directly analogous to the
Griswold case; (4) the state has no overriding, compelling interest in legis-
lating against abortions.
Noting that criminal statutes must meet the test of clarity so that "'No
one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes,' 49 the court held that the phrase "necessary to
39 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
40 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942).
41 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
42 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
43 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
44 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1960).
45 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).
46 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964).
47 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969).
48 Id. at 357, 458 P.2d at 197.
49 Id.
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preserve her life" is so vague that no one knows whether "necessity" exists
where a patient threatens suicide, manifests potential neurotic or psychotic
tendencies, or is in imminent or remote physical danger. Such vagueness, the
court held, is unconstitutional. The court also observed that the rule in California
is that "necessary to preserve" does not require a finding of certainty or im-
minence of death. The court further observed that common law definitions of
"necessary to preserve . . . life" are unreliable because abortion was not a
common law offense."0
Having held the statute was unconstitutionally vague, the court addressed
itself to fundamental constitutional rights. The right of privacy, said the court,
is the basis of "the woman's right to life and to choose whether to bear children.
The woman's right to life is involved because childbirth involves risks of death."' 51
Citing Griswold, the California Supreme Court analogized an extension of the
fundamental right to privacy. The court held that the right to privacy extends
from preventing pregnancy, under Griswold, to terminating pregnancy.
The threshhold issue, the court said, was "whether the state has a compel-
ling interest in the regulation of a subject which is within the police powers
of the state." 52 Medical and sociological research showing criminal abortions
to be the most common single cause of death among pregnant women was ex-
amined by the court in light of the historical fact that the original California
anti-abortion statute had been enacted in 1850 to save pregnant women from
the dangers of death resulting from medicine's inability at that time to prevent
post-operative fatal infection. The court agreed with amicus curiae for Dr. Belous:
"These recorded facts bring one face-to-face with the hard, shocking
-almost brutal-reality that our statute designed in 1850 to protect
women from serious risks to life and health has in modern times become
a scourge."53
The appellee had argued that the state had a compelling historical interest
in protecting the fetus which would be aborted in the absence of an anti-abortion
statute. The court, however, was unconvinced. Noting that the abortion statute
in question permitted an exception to criminal culpability where the mother's
life was endangered, the court concluded that even the anti-abortion statute
regarded the mother's right to life superior to that of the fetus.
(b) United States v. Vuitch 54
The defendant in this case was a physician convicted of abortion
in Washington, D.C. The relevant statute excused criminal culpability, if
the abortion was performed to preserve the life or health of the mother, except
50 Id. at 358, 458 P.2d at 198.
51 Id. at 359, 458 P.2d at 199.
52 Id. at 360, 458 P.2d at 200.
53 Id. at 361, 458 P.2d at 201.
54 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
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that the statute also directed that such abortions could be performed only at
the direction of a competent, licensed physician. The constitutional attack upon
the statute was the same here as in Belous. The court held that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.55 The court disagreed with Belous, however, in holding
that Congress had the authority to legislate against abortions not performed by
a competent, licensed physician. In reaching this conclusion, the court held the
statute was severable; that is, the unconstitutionally vague condition precedent
to an abortion ("necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health
. . .") could be struck down without also striking out that part of the statute
that Congress constitutionally included ("under the direction of a competent,
licensed practitioner of medicine.") 56 In other respect, Vuitch followed Belous.
(c) Babbitz v. McCann57
The plaintiff, a Wisconsin physician, filed a class action to have the statute
declared unconstitutional. The Wisconsin statute is substantially similar to
California's and the District of Columbia's in that it provides for a therapeutic
abortion which:
(a) Is performed by a physician; and
(b) Is necessary, or is advised by two other physicians as necessary,
to save the life of the mother; and
(c) Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed mater-
nity hospital. . . .s
The major argument asserted by plaintiff was that the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague in using the word "necessary" and the phrase "to save the
life of the mother." The federal court held the statute did not violate fourteenth
amendment due process:
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a criminal statute
must be definite enough to acquaint those who are subject to it with
the conduct which will render them liable to its penalties ...
We believe that [the statute] sets forth with reasonable clarity and
sufficient particularity the kind of conduct which will constitute a vio-
lation .... 59
The court then specifically disagreed in this regard with both Belous and Vuitch.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's equal protection argument. Plaintiff ar-
gued that indigent women were not receiving equal protection because they
could not obtain an abortion in Wisconsin and could not travel to a country
or state where such abortions were permitted, whereas wealthy women could
65 Id. at 1034.
56 Id. at 1035.
57 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
58 Id. at 294.
59 Id. at 297.
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afford to go there. Although the court found the situation reprehensible, it held
that the fourteenth amendment did not contemplate such a definition of equal
protection. 0
The court, however, did hold the statute unconstitutional. Citing Griswold,
Belous and Vuitch, the court held that women have an absolute prerogative to
terminate a pregnancy prior to quickening, under the right of privacy. The
court further held (1) that the state had no compelling interest in proscribing
abortions prior to quickening, and (2) that judicially restricting the state's
proscription to a time after quickening was merely a return to the common
law rule.61 Concurring, sub silentio, with Vuitch, the court concluded its opin-
ion by stating:
Under its police power, the state can regulate certain aspects of abor-
tion. Thus, it is permissible for the state to require that abortions be
conducted by qualified physicians. The police power of the state does
not, however, entitle it to deny to a woman the basic right reserved to
her under the ninth amendment to decide whether she should carry or
reject an embryo which has not yet quickened. 62
(d) Roe v. Wade3
The next statute to fall was in Texas. The statute flatly prohibited all abor-
tions except "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." 64 The court
relied upon the ninth amendment in holding that women had a fundamental
right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.65 The decision also noted
that the scope of the state's compelling interest was very narrow. The court
reasoned that the statute was not within that scope:
These include . ..seeing to it that abortions are performed by competent
persons and in adequate surroundings. Concern over abortion of the
'quickened' fetus may well rank as another such interest. The difficulty
with the Texas Abortion Law is that, even if they promote these inter-
ests, they far outstrip these justifications in their impact by prohibiting
all abortions except those performed 'for the purpose of saving the life
of the mother.' . . . [T]he Texas statutes, in their monolithic inter-
diction, sweep far beyond any areas of compelling state interest .. .
[T]he Texas Abortion Laws ...are also unconstitutionally vague.66
(e) Doe v. Bolton67
The nominal plaintiff's application for a therapeutic abortion was denied
by the hospital abortion committee, which was authorized by state statutes to
60 Id. at 298.
61 Id. at 300-01.
62 Id. at 302.
63 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
64 Id. at 1219, n.2.
65 Id. at 1221-22.
66 Id. at 1223.
67 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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rule on each application. Relying upon Griswold, the other cases cited in this
section and upon the first and ninth amendments, the court held that a state
may enact legislation controlling the medical quality of an abortion but not the
medical reasons for a therapeutic abortion:
Rather than regulating merely the quality of the decision to have an
abortion, and the manner of its performance, the Georgia statute also
limits the number of reasons for which an abortion may be sought.
This the State may not do, because such action unduly restricts a
decision sheltered by the Constitutional right to privacy .... The ques-
tion becomes a matter of statutory overbreadth.68
(e) Doe v. Scott69
This class action attacked the Illinois anti-abortion statute on the ground
of denial of due process. The statute, as noted above, prohibited all abortions
except those "performed by a physician licensed to practice . .. because neces-
sary for the preservation of the woman's life."'70 As in most of the preceding
cases, this language was held to be unconstitutionally vague. Cognizant of the
holding in Griswold, the court further held:
A woman's interest in privacy and in control over her body is just as
seriously interfered with by a law which prohibits abortions as it is by
a law which prohibits the use of contraceptives. . . . We do not believe
that the state has a compelling interest in preserving all fetal life which
justifies the gross intrusion on a woman's privacy which is involved in
forcing her to bear an unwanted child.71
Clearly by the time this case was decided, a pattern had been established
by the federal district courts reviewing abortion statutes: (1) Generally, lan-
guage obviating criminal culpability where a therapeutic abortion was performed
for the purpose or necessity of saving the woman's life was held to be violative
of due process because of vagueness or overbreadth; (2) women have a funda-
mental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy before quickening under the
first, ninth and fourteenth amendments; (3) the state does not have a compelling
interest in regulating the reasons for abortions, although it may have a sufficient
interest in regulating the medical or clinical surroundings in which abortions
are performed; (4) the woman's right to life predominates over her baby's
putative right to life, especially prior to quickening; (5) the state does not
have a compelling interest in protecting all fetal life.
2. The Cases against Abolition of Anti-Abortion Statutes
(a) Steinberg v. Brown72
This case chronologically preceded Scott. The statute attacked provided that
induced abortions were a criminal offense unless "such miscarriage is neces-
68 Id. at 1056.
69 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. IM. 1971).
70 IM. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1969).
71 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
72 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
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sary to preserve [the woman's] life... . ,73 Plaintiff argued that this phrase was
unconstitutionally vague and cited the cases already surveyed as support. The
federal district court in Ohio disagreed:
It appears to us that the vagueness which disturbs the plaintiffs herein
results from their own strained construction of the language used ...
The words of the Ohio statute, taken in their ordinary meaning, have
over a long period of years proved entirely adequate to inform the
public . . . of what is forbidden. The problem of the plaintiffs is not
that they do not understand, but that basically they do not accept, its
proscription. 74
The plaintiff's second argument to the court was that Griswold recognized
a penumbral marital right of privacy in relation to the use of contraceptives
and that the right had logically and properly been extended in subsequent cases
to include the right to terminate a pregnancy. The court, however, distinguished
Griswold on the facts and expressed the belief that the contraception issue in
Griswold had been erroneously analogized to abortion cases. The court stated:
Thus contraception ... is concerned with preventing the creation of a
new and independent life . . . It seems clear . . . that the legal conclu-
sions in Griswold as to the rights of individuals to determine without
governmental interference whether or not to enter into the processes
of procreation cannot be extended to cover those situations wherein,
voluntarily or involuntarily, the preliminaries have ended, and a new
life has begun. Once human life has commenced, the constitutional
protections found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose
upon the state the duty of safeguarding it.75
In dictum the court offered an alternative solution to women who are pregnant
with unwanted babies. Noting that plaintiffs equated "the necessity of giving
birth... with the necessity of rearing the child," the court suggested that women
who do not wish to rear their children surrender them for adoption. 76 The
court also disposed of plaintiff's arguments based upon the equal protection
clause and the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment,
the latter being described as "pay [ing] the piper" 77 rather than as punishment.
(b) Corkey v. Edwards78
This case is somewhat anomalous. The statute under attack prohibited
induced abortions except where a physician reasonably established that (a) a
substantial risk to the life or health of the woman was present, or (b) a sub-
stantial risk of physical or mental defect in the child was present, or (c) the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.79 The statute also required, inter alia,
that the woman have resided in the state "at least four months immediately
73 Id. at 748-49.
74 Id. at 745.
75 Id. at 746-47.
76 Id. at 748.
77 Id. at 749.
78 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. N.C. 1971).
79 Id. at 1249, n.1.
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preceding the operation being performed .... ,"8o The court held the residency
requirement was overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional."' The balance of
the statute, however, was upheld. The court agreed that women have a funda-
mental right to decide whether to become pregnant but disagreed that such a
right extends to a prerogative to terminate a pregnancy:
Exercise of the right to an abortion on request is not essential to an
effective exercise of the right not to bear a child, if a child for what-
ever reason is not wanted . . . Before the "moment" of conception
has occured, . . . the choice whether or not to bear children is made in
circumstances quite different from those in which such a choice might
be made after conception ... Genetically, the adult man was from such
a beginning all that he essentially has become in every cell and human
attribute .... Thus the root problem in the controversy over abortion
is the one of assigning value to embryonic and fetal life .... 82
The court explained its reluctance to strike the entire statute as being based
upon a refusal to make a "value judgment" about whether North Carolina's
statute should be changed to permit abortion on demand prior to quickening.
"The legislature," the court held, "is the proper arena for the resolution of
'fundamentally differing views.' ,,83
3. Summary of the Case Law
None of the cases previously discussed have been decided by the United
States Supreme Court at this writing. The arguments on both sides are reasonably
strong. On the one hand, those favoring abortion statutes argue they are neces-
sary to preserve the fetus' life which commenced upon conception. On the other
hand, abolitionists describe the fetus' rights to life as subordinate to the mother's
right to life. Intermingled in these arguments, the courts discuss the nature of
the state's "compelling interest" regarding the right of privacy. The distinction
drawn between the right of privacy, which supersedes the state's interest in
banning the use of contraceptives, as it is developed in Griswold, and the right
of privacy which supersedes the state's interest in prohibiting abortions seems
justified. As the Steinberg court noted, the former permits two adults to choose
not to enter the procreational process, while the latter permits them to terminate
a pregnancy that they participated in creating. Equating the two ideas seems
to strain logic. Nonetheless, the case for abolition of abortion statutes may be
the stronger of the two arguments; but the more forthright judicial approach
appears to be to seek legislative guidance on the policy question of whether a
fetus is a human life.
" I :i ' " s
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IV. THE FATHER'S RIGHTS
One of the peripheral but potentially significant questions left unanswered
by the current debate, the statutes, and the case law is whether the father of
the fetus has standing to enjoin the mother's induced abortion where the two
parents are married and where no compelling issue of the mother's or fetus'
health is present.8 4
In Flast v. Cohen,8 5 the Supreme Court stated the requirements for standing:
[I]n ruling on standing it is both appropriate and necessary to look
to the substantive issues . . . to determine whether there is a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudi-
cated. 86
In the hypothetical situation presented, the husband would be asserting his right
as father to enjoin the destruction of a child which is genetically one-half his.
The assertion of such a right would cause a direct confrontation between the
rights of the mother recognized in the previous cases, and the father's asserted
rights. The logical connection between the status asserted by the father and
the claim sought to be adjudicated (the termination or continuation of the
fetus' life) seems too clear to belabor with an extended discussion.8 7
The law, of course, provides for either parent to sue as next friend of his
minor child. Tradition and the common law have viewed fathers as the heads
of their families, sociological research notwithstanding. Certainly, enough legal
support for the concept of fetal life having protectable rights exists to give
credence to the father in the hypothetical situation suing for himself and as
next friend of the fetus:
[Mledical authority has recognized long since that the child is in
existence from the moment of conception, and for many purposes its
existence is recognized by the law. The criminal law regards it as a
separate entity, and the law of property considers it in being for all
purposes which are to its benefit, such as taking by will or descent....
All writers who have discussed the problem have joined ... in main-
taining that the unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much
a person in the street as the mother.88
Thus, one might expect to find several cases where the father of a fetus has
sought to enjoin the lawful abortion sought by his wife. The contrary, however,
is true. This writer has found only one case where a similar right was asserted:
84 The putative father of an illegitimate child has no rights in Illinois as to the child.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 106 3/4, § 51 et seq. (1969) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (1969).
85 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
86 Id. at 102.
87 One may look at the father's common law and statutory duties to support and care
for his family as giving rise to some assertable right to control or direct the destiny of the
family unit.
88 Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine, and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 233, 234-44 (1969).
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In 1967, a Catholic husband, in the process of divorcing his wife,
sought to have the court rule unconstitutional the law permitting his
wife's prospective hospital abortion on the grounds that it deprived the
potential offspring and himself of due process. The court held that the
issue was medical rather than legal, that the wife's rights superseded
the husband's, and that in simultaneously seeking to divorce his wife
the husband had indeed forfeited his 'normal family rights.'8 9
Several observations about this case seem in order: (1) the California statute
which the plaintiff challenged was subsequently declared unconstitutional in
Belous; (2) the father forfeited his "normal family rights" by seeking divorce;
the implication, of course, is that the father had rights to enforce against the
wife and might have had standing had he not simultaneously filed for divorce;
(3) some of the cases surveyed in the previous sections agree that the mother's
rights supersede the fetus' rights. This final point seems to be the really dispos-
itive holding. Inferring from the cases, one might establish priorities of rights
with the mother's rights above the baby's and father's, and with the baby's
rights superior to the father's.
Since the general view is that the mother's rights are superior, and because
the woman is the one who must bear the child and is the one most likely to
have custody of any children from the marriage should it end in divorce or
separation, the courts might reasonably be expected to consider the mother's
decision to have an abortion more significant than the father's refusal to consent
to it. If, on the other hand, the United States Supreme Court holds that fetal
life is constitutionally equivalent to life outside the uterus, the father clearly
will be in a stronger position to argue against an abortion. He then could assert
his traditional common law position as protector of the family rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately the resolution of the issues presented and the discrepancies found
in the cases surveyed herein will be resolved by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court will again be confronted with balancing legal rights: the right
of privacy, as found in the first and ninth amendments, against the police power
of the states to control the clinical conditions and the reasons for abortion. The
legal issues, however, appear to be no more than a reflection of societal at-
titudes. If the public opinion polls are correct, the majority of people for whom
the legislative and judicial processes were created want, at the very least, reform
of abortion laws and, at most, abolition of those statutes. Viewing the cases
surveyed against the societal attitudes, the courts are beginning to respond to
a substantial demand that the state relinquish control of privacy.
If the United States Supreme Court holds that the states may properly
regulate both the clinical circumstances and the medical reasons for abortion,
89 Hall, Abortions Laws: A Call for Reform, 18 De Paul L. Rev. Rev. 584, 591 (1969),
wherein is cited O'Beirne v. Superior Court, 1 Civ. 25174 (California Sup. Ct., Dec. 6, 1967).
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fewer women will suffer and die because of criminal abortions. If, on the other
hand, the United States Supreme Court holds that the states have a compelling
interest in legislating the reasons for abortion, the back-alley butchers will
continue to flourish. One thing is certain, however; if the Supreme Court does
hold for the states in the matter of marital privacy, individuals will continue
to procure criminal abortions, possibly at a progressively increased rate. Thus,
the Court seems to be faced with not only the legal argument over the rights
of the fetus as a human life, but also with the pressing issue regarding human
rights generally-society's tendency to enforce its own definition and application
of constitutional rights regardless of the Court's rulings.
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